Jurisdiction and Management of Arctic Marine Transportation by Westermeyer, William E. & Goyal, Vinod
VOL. 39, NO. 4 (DECEMBER 
ARCTIC 
1986) P. 338-349 
Jurisdiction and Management of Arctic Marine Transportation’ 
WILLIAM E. WESTERMEYER2 and VINOD GOYAL3 
(Received 27 August 1985; accepted in revised form 2 January 1986) 
ABSTRACT. Although the United States and Canada have different views regarding jurisdiction over the waters surrounding arctic islands, both 
countries nevertheless share many concerns about marine transportation in high latitudes. Among these concerns are environmental protection, safety, 
impacts of development on northern peoples and third party transit of arctic waters. These common concerns suggest that there is much potential for 
cooperative activity and problem solving in the Arctic. Specific suggestions are made regarding possibilities for coordination of transit management 
activities. A range of options is presented for both the jurisdiction and management elements of a transit regime for the Arctic. It is the thesis of this ar+icle 
that, despite jurisdictional disagreements, the U.S. and Canada can develop a transit regime that satisfies the interests and concerns of both. 
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RÉSUMÉ. Bien que les États-Unis et le Canada entretiennent de différentes perspectives quant à la juridiction sur les eaux entourant les îles arctiques, 
ces deux pays s’intéressent tout de même communément aux nombreux problemes des transports maritimes dans les latitudes élevées. Leurs intérêts 
comprennent entre autres la protection de l’environnement, la sécurité, les conséquences du développement sur les peuples nordiques et les déplacements 
par de tierces parties dans les eaux arctiques. L’article présente des suggestions traitant en particulier des possibilités de coordination des activités de 
gestion des transits. On explique également un éventail d’options que pourraient suivre les 4léments juridictionnel et gestionnaire d’un régime de transit 
dans l’Arctique. L’article stipule que même aux différences d’opinion juridictionnelle, les Etats-Unis et le Canada peuvent élaborer un régime de transit 
qui pourrait satisfaire les besoins de chacun tout en répondant à leurs inquiétudes. 
Mots clés: Arctique, juridiction, gestion, transport maritime, régime 
INTRODUCTION 
The potential for commercial marine transportation through 
United States and  Canadian arctic waters  has  been evident since 
the  tanker Manhattan transited  the  Northwest  Passage  in 1969. 
This  same  experimental  voyage clarified the differences between 
these two countries over the principles that should govern 
jurisdiction in  high  latitude waters. The type  of jurisdiction that 
can  be  claimed in arctic waters is important since it determines 
the type of control applicable to navigation. Theoretically, 
jurisdiction may  range from absolute jurisdiction (inherent in 
the sector  principle) to none at all (inherent in the notion  of the 
freedom of the seas). It is the  thesis  of  this article that, although 
the  United States and  Canada  have  taken fundamentally differ- 
ent positions  regarding jurisdiction in the Arctic, they do share 
many concerns about marine transportation in high latitude 
waters, and, therefore, there are many promising alternatives 
for jurisdiction and  management  between the extremes of no 
control and  absolute  control  by  which  both c untries may  satisfy 
their interests and concerns. 
The  probable  growth of marine transportation in  the  Arctic 
suggests it is timely  to  begin  serious consideration about resolv- 
ing disagreements concerning jurisdiction and control over 
arctic navigation, as well as to design greater cooperative 
mechanisms for the  management  of  marine transportation in the 
best interests of both countries. The purpose here is thus to 
identify  and  evaluate alternative jurisdiction and  management 
regimes for the United States and Canada. Since the  two 
countries share many  mutual interests in a rational and workable 
transit regime, some of the options identified may appeal to both 
countries. No doubt, readers will  be able to formulate variations 
of  the  basic  alternatives  presented here, perhaps  by recombining 
elements of  these alternatives, which one  or both parties may 
find more  appealing  than  those suggested. 
The article will have served its purpose if the process of 
reaching a consensus is advanced.  Consensus is less likely if 
both parties emphasize the strategic approach and thus bend 
every effort toward maximizing their own gains. It is more 
likely to be  reached  through a problem-solving approach that 
stresses recognition  of conflicts as  common or joint problems 
requiring efforts to accommodate several legitimate interests 
(Young  and Osherenko, 1984). It  is possible, of course, to argue 
about  which  country  has  the stronger position according to the 
principles  of  international law. The United States and  Canada 
can both  make  persuasive  arguments  in  support  of their posi- 
tions based on these principles. However, such a course is 
unproductive  if  the objective is  to  reach a  consensus rather than 
to determine a winner. A workable navigation regime may 
require  that  both  countries  make  some  important compromises, 
but, based on the  number  of alternatives possible, both countries 
may  be able to significantly advance their mutual  and separate 
interests. 
The impetus for consideration of jurisdiction and  manage- 
ment of arctic marine  transportation lies in accelerated oil  and 
gas development within the arctic frontier areas of both the 
United States and Canada. Resource developers of  both coun- 
tries are spending billions of dollars in the search for new 
reserves. It is anticipated  that  some  of  the oil and  gas expected to 
be found will be transported to southern markets by marine 
tankers. In the United States Arctic, huge reserves at the 
Prudhoe Bay and Kuparuk oil fields on the North Slope of 
Alaska are currently  being produced. Oil from these fields is 
transported to the  marine  terminal in southern Alaska  by  way  of 
the 1300 km Trans-Alaska pipeline. 
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A number of smaller discoveries have also been  made  in the 
U.S. Arctic. Decisions  to  produce these smaller fields, particu- 
larly if they  are  remote  from  the existing transportation infra- 
structure, depend  largely on the  price  of oil, which  has  been 
“soft” for some time. Nevertheless, the U.S. oil industry is 
optimistic about  Arctic development, and  the search for large, 
new deposits is continuing  at a brisk pace. Exploratory activity 
is growing, both along the arctic coastal plain and offshore. 
Prospects are excellent for discoveries in the Beaufort and 
Bering  seas (where lease  sales  have  already  been held) and  in  the 
Chukchi Sea  (which  is  likely  to  be  leased in the future). 
Transportation infrastructure in areas distant from the Trans- 
Alaska  pipeline  is  nonexistent  but  will  be  required before any oil 
is marketed. Several  marine  transportation schemes for both oil 
and  liquefied  natural  gas  have  already  been studied. 
Transportation of crude oil  from arctic Canada  began  on a 
small scale in the summer of 1985 when Panarctic Oils Ltd. 
shipped 100 000 barrels of crude aboard the MV Imperial 
Bedford from  its  Bent  Horn oil field on Cameron Island in the 
High Arctic. The Bent Horn field is estimated to contain 
350-500 million barrels of oil, and Panarctic hopes it can 
continue and  eventually  expand  this operation. Large quantities 
of natural gas have also been  found  in  the  High Arctic. A project 
- the  Arctic  Pilot  Project - has  been  proposed to demonstrate 
the feasibility of moving  gas  from the Sverdrup  Basin in the 
Queen  Elizabeth Islands south  by  icebreaking liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) tankers. Exploratory activity is continuing in two 
other promising areas. The most important of these is the 
Beaufort SedMackenzie Delta, where a number  of oil and  gas 
discoveries have  been made. So far no single discovery  has been 
large enough to justify the enormous production  and transporta- 
tion costs associated  with operating in this region, but industry 
expectations remain  high.  Should large hydrocarbon discover- 
ies  be made, it  is  likely  that  at least a portion of the resource will 
be  moved  to  market  by tankers. Similarly, exploratory activity 
is occurring in  the  eastern Arctic, including activity in Baffin 
Bay  and the Labrador Sea. Marine transportation is the primary 
option  being  considered  to  transport hydrocarbons found  in  this 
area. 
The use of marine  transport  modes  in the Arctic is currently 
limited to the short  summer  season  when  open  water enables 
vessels  not  ice-reinforced to operate safely. During this season 
resupply  vessels  can  visit  remote settlements, ore  from several 
High Arctic mines can be ferried south, and the drill ships, 
drilling rigs, and  barges  owned  by the oil and  gas industry can 
reach their high latitude work stations. The  present scale of this 
transportation  activity  is small; however, the potential for 
greater use  of arctic waterways is enormous.  The United States 
oil industry has considered marine transportation alternatives 
for moving  hydrocarbons  that  may  be discovered in the Bering 
and Chukchi seas. Resources discovered in these areas would 
most likely be  moved  to  Pacific Basin  markets.  Consideration 
has also been  given  to  transporting U.S. Beaufort Sea oil and 
gas, if discovered  in  producible quantities, to eastern markets 
via the Northwest Passage.  This scenario is most plausible if 
resources are discovered in excess of amounts that can be 
carried  by the Trans-Alaska Pipeline or if the new  resources are 
too  remote from  the  pipeline. 
Canada  may also transport its arctic resources to east coast 
markets through the waters of the Canadian archipelago. 
Alternatively (or in addition), there is  a possibility  that Canada, 
perhaps  in conjunction with Japan, may use tankers to transport 
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oil and/or gas  by  way  of  the  Bering Strait to  Pacific markets. 
And finally, although  not likely in the near future, third  party 
use of the arctic alternative may begin. A direct northern 
transportation link  between Europe and the Pacific, long sought 
by  early explorers, may eventually become a reality. 
Before widespread, year-round commercial  navigation  does 
become a reality  in the Arctic, a number  of technical problems 
must  be solved. It is,  however, an explicit assumption of this 
article that  technical  barriers to arctic marine transportation can 
be overcome, if the need to do so arises, and  that the economics 
of  marine  transportation will, in specific instances, prove com- 
petitive with other transportation alternatives. A number of 
studies have  been  done  showing  that for some markets the price 
of oil need  not  rise  much further for arctic marine transportation 
to be competitive with other options. These particular issues 
will  not  be  considered further within  this article. 
No special coordination or cooperation is needed, of course, 
for the domestic transportation activities of the United States or 
Canada. But the potential exists for navigation through each 
other’s exclusive economic  zones  and territorial seas, as well as 
for third party use of these waters. Further, since navigation 
through the often ice-covered  areas  of the Arctic may require 
special rules and  regulations  not applicable to ordinary  marine 
transportation, cooperation and coordination is deemed  a 
necessity. 
U.S. AND CANADIAN  INTERESTS AND CONCERNS 
The potential for increased  navigation  in arctic waters  high- 
lights a number  of concerns shared  by the United States and 
Canada  and for which greater and/or more coordinated manage- 
ment  may  be required. Four mutual interests or  concerns may  be 
readily  identified:  1)  protection  of  the environment; 2) safety; 3) 
minimizing  adverse  impacts on northern peoples; and 4) con- 
cern about  third  party transit of arctic waters. 
The  impact of  transportation accidents and  the special envi- 
ronmental hazards encountered  in the Arctic  account for mutual 
concern about the environment.  The  presence of ice in  many 
areas throughout  most  of  the year, frequent storms, extremely 
cold temperatures and long periods of darkness combine to 
make navigation in the Arctic particularly difficult (Roots, 
1979) and underscore the reasons for Canada’s enactment in 
1970 of special regulations for protecting the arctic marine 
environment. Although  some of the provisions of the Canadian 
Arctic  Waters  Pollution  Prevention  Act are controversial, Cana- 
da’s interests in  preventing arctic pollution are in most  ways 
mirrored  by the United States. 
Of particular concern is the possibility  of  an  oil spill from one 
of the large tankers  that  may eventually be operating in arctic 
waters. Such  a spill could cause substantial adverse  environ- 
mental impacts.  These impacts  may include pollution of coast- 
lines (especially destructive if  breeding habitats are affected), 
contamination of marine  mammals (such as bowhead whales) 
and  waterfowl  and destruction of fish and other marine organ- 
isms. Although the risk of catastrophic spills is low, if a  tanker 
accident were to occur  in  moving  pack ice, oil  could  be carried 
under the ice for literally hundreds of kilometres, making 
recovery or in situ burning of a significant amount of oil 
impossible.  Moreover, the use of  some chemical dispersants as 
an oil spill countermeasure may be as harmful to organisms in 
the water  column as the oil itself. The  increased level of  noise 
that ships navigating  through ice will generate is another possi- 
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ble  adverse  environmental impact. Studies have  been  conducted 
suggesting  that the endangered  bowhead whales, in particular, 
display flight  responses  in  the  presence  of  ship noise. The full 
impact on  the  bowhead  population  of  noise disturbances, how- 
ever, is not  yet known. Finally, the artificial leads opened  by 
ships moving through the ice could interfere with the move- 
ments  of  marine  mammals  and  with  the  indigenous  people  who 
hunt  in  these areas. 
Although  the  advocates  of  tanker  proposals  have  made sug- 
gestions that  would  minimize  the  risk  of a spill, the  possibility of 
a tanker spill in the Arctic cannot be discounted. Such spills 
would  be  difficult  to  clean up for a number  of reasons. Most 
importantly, it is impossible  to predict the exact location  of a 
tanker spill. Thus, countermeasures equipment could not be 
pre-positioned, and a response  would  be difficult to implement 
fast enough before extensive oil spreading and weathering 
occurred. Further, tanker spills generally result in the release of 
a large amount of oil  in  the  marine environment  during a short 
period of time. Responses  to  such spills require a  considerable 
amount of equipment and manpower and adequate response 
preparation. The absence  of infrastructure in  most of the  Arctic 
would  make  any  oil spill countermeasures difficult. 
The problem of safe navigation in arctic waters, which is 
made difficult by environmental hazards and lack of support 
services  and facilities, is a second  mutual interest. In general, 
safe navigation will require provision of extensive support 
services. Although  some essential services are  already  provided 
on a limited scale, the scope of these activities will  need to be 
expanded greatly. Communications, navigation aids, weather 
and ice forecasting, icebreaker support, repair facilities and 
search  and  rescue operations are  some  of  the s rvices required to 
ensure navigation  safety  in  the Arctic. Indeed, safe, year-round 
transportation  in  arctic  waters  will  be  possible  only if a l support 
services  and  facilities  to  accommodate  that transportation are 
provided. 
A third  concern  of  both countries, and  particularly  of  those 
citizens who live in the far north, is the effect that marine 
transportation will have on speeding up the general  develop- 
ment of the region. The Inuit in both countries value their 
distinctive native lifestyle, but development activities have 
already  affected their culture. The increased accessibility implied 
by the opening of commercial navigation  routes  can  work only 
to accelerate these changes. The Inuit are  not  averse  to change, 
and  some  changes  have  had  the effect of  substantially improving 
Inuit living standards; nevertheless, the impact of greater activ- 
ity  in the Arctic is not entirely predictable or controllable. Inuit 
are particularly  worried  that opportunities for subsistence hunt- 
ing  will  diminish  as  more  onshore facilities are established, as 
offshore petroleum  drilling increases, and as marine navigation 
grows.  The Inuit  in  both  countries are opposed to marine  tanker 
operations and  favor the development  of pipelines to accommo- 
date hydrocarbon exploitation. For example, the Arctic Pilot 
Project was  actively  opposed  in 1982-83 by the Inuit Circumpo- 
lar Conference, an organization composed of Inuit from the 
United States, Canada  and Greenland.  The United States and 
Canada  both face the  problem of accommodating these Inuit 
concerns, yet  still  advancing  resource extraction and transporta- 
tion activities in  the Arctic. 
Finally, although  problems associated with  third  party transit 
of arctic waters  are  not in theory different from  those associated 
with U.S.  or Canadian navigation, third  party navigation would 
increase the amount  of  activity  in the Arctic and  would therefore 
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tend  to increase the  possibility for adverse  impacts.  Moreover, 
the costs of  management for both  countries  would  be greater. 
Although  the  United States and  Canada  may  be  able  to  agree 
upon  and enforce  appropriate arctic navigation  standards 
between themselves, enforcing any special arctic regulations 
over third parties that have not agreed to them is potentially 
more difficult. 
Canada  and  the  United States are  both  cognizant  of  the special 
difficulties involved in navigating arctic waters, yet neither 
country has indicated its intention to deny others access to 
transportation routes. It  is  in  the interests of both countries to 
allow  marine  transportation  to  proceed if safe and environmen- 
tally  sound  navigation  can be conducted. Canada  has stated on 
more than one occasion that it intends to encourage, and not 
restrict, international transit through the Northwest Passage 
(Smith, 1978; Clark, 1985). However, the manner by which 
access is  to  be  controlled  in  this  area constitutes an important 
disagreement  between  the  two countries. The central element of 
this disagreement is the difference of opinion between the 
countries regarding jurisdiction over  the  waters of the Arctic. 
The type  of jurisdiction applicable  will determine the  kind of 
passage  available  to foreign ships and  the extent of  management 
that  can  be imposed. 
Until 10 September  1985 Canada’s position regarding juris- 
diction over the  waters  of the arctic archipelago was ambiguous. 
On  this date, Canada’s Secretary of State for External  Affairs 
issued  an  Order  in  Council establishing straight baselines  around 
the perimeter of the  Canadian arctic archipelago to  be effective 1 
January  1986 (Clark, 1985). This declaration was  prompted  in 
part by the  August  1985 transit of  the U.S.  icebreaker Polar Sea 
through the Northwest Passage, which  was  interpreted by many 
Canadians as a challenge to their sovereignty in the area. 
Significantly, McRae had suggested as recently as 1982 that 
establishing  internal  waters  would  be  an  option  to consider only 
if other efforts to exercise adequate control in arctic waters fail 
(McRae  and Goundry, 1982). 
By proposing  to  establish  baselines  in  this manner, Canada 
has  made  it clear that  it considers the waters  between  its arctic 
islands to be  internal and, thus, under absolute Canadian sover- 
eignty. However, according  to  Article 8(2) of  the  Law  of the Sea 
Convention  (which  Canada supports), where  the establishment 
of straight baselines  has the effect of enclosing internal waters 
areas not previously considered as such, a right of innocent 
passage shall exist in those waters (United Nations, 1982). 
Thus, even if Canada’s straight baseline claim is upheld, this 
may not in itself be sufficient to prohibit innocent passage. 
Canada would have to prove that its internal waters were 
acquired through historic title (demonstrated by “long and 
consistent dominion accepted by a majority of nations”) in 
order to prohibit, if  it  desired  to do so, innocent passage through 
the arctic archipelago. Canadian claims regarding historic use 
have  not  been clear or consistent (Beauchamp, 1984). 
Even prior to the 10 September declaration, however, the 
intent  of  Canadian  assertions  and legislation regarding its north- 
em waters has been to exert control to the maximum extent 
possible. One  of  the initial mechanisms established for asserting 
control in this region  was  the  Arctic Waters Pollution Preven- 
tion  Act (AWPPA) of 1970. Although the explicit purpose of 
the AWPPA was to enable Canada to control pollution in 
predominantly  ice-covered waters, the implicit purpose of the 
legislation was to advance  Canadian claims for sovereignty  “in 
such a manner so as  not to provoke official denials from other 
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nations” (Reid, 1974). The jurisdiction that Canada asserts 
under the act includes the power to legislate and to enact 
regulations  governing  all  shipping  that comes within  the areas to 
which  the  legislation extends, as  well  as  the  power to enforce the 
standards  imposed by the legislation. The  establishment of this 
pollution legislation was seen by Canada as a “functional 
approach whereby Canada will exercise only the jurisdiction 
required  to  achieve  the specific and  vital purpose of environ- 
mental preservation” (Beesley, 1972). The three major ele- 
ments of the  AWPPA  are establishment of a  160 km pollution 
control  zone  around  Canadian  coasts  north f 60”, prohibition of 
“waste” disposal  within  this zone, and establishment of strict 
construction, manning, navigation, and cargo standards and 
financial responsibility requirements for all vessels operating 
within  the zone. 
If Canada’s  arctic  waters are not judged to  be internal, then 
jurisdiction is limited  to a 12-mile territorial sea  and  an exclu- 
sive economic zone extending off the mainland and around 
each  of  the arctic islands. Canadian territorial seas established 
by opposite land  masses  would overlap in two  places  along the 
Northwest Passage, in Barrow Strait and  in the Prince of Wales 
Strait. Article 17 of the  Law  of  the Sea Convention specifies that 
foreign  shipping  has  the  right  of  innocent  passage  within territo- 
rial seas; however, foreign ships must  comply  with all coastal 
state laws  and  regulations in conformity  with  other  provisions of
the treaty  and  other rules of international law. The coastal state 
may regulate, among other things, environmental protection, 
conservation of living  resources  and scientific research. Under 
normal conditions, the  coastal state may not regulate design, 
construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships unless 
regulations are giving effect to already established international 
standards. The coastal state may  suspend  innocent passage only 
if a ship’s passage constitutes a threat to the coastal state’s 
security  (United Nations, 1982). 
The authority  contained  in  Article  234  of the Law  of the Sea 
Convention  allowing  adoption of special marine pollution con- 
trol  regulations in ice-covered  areas appears to enable arctic rim 
countries to exercise the type of navigation control necessary  in 
ice-covered areas, including most of Canada’s northern  waters 
at  least part of  the year. In general, however,  Canada’s ability to 
control activities within  its territorial seas is more limited than  in 
its internal waters, but  possibly less limited (depending  on how 
Article 234 is interpreted) than if the Barrow and Prince of 
Wales straits were  considered to be “international” straits. 
It is the contention  of  the  United States and other  maritime 
countries that transit through straits of the arctic archipelago 
should  be  governed  by the regime  of international straits. If the 
Barrow  and  Prince of Wales straits are considered international, 
then there exists a nonsuspendable  right  of innocent  passage for 
foreign vessels. In a straits regime the balance between the 
prerogatives of coastal states  and those of other states interested 
in  navigation is tilted  toward navigation. Moreover, the United 
States has consistently held that “all questions of territorial 
definition and  rights  in  the  Arctic  must  be r solved  through the 
application  of  general  law of the sea  regimes . . . defined by the 
international community” (Smith, 1978) and that, therefore, 
the promulgation  of  such laws as the Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act and possibly the more recent declaration of 
straight baselines  encompassing  such a large area are impermis- 
sible  unilateral extensions of international law. 
Unlike Canada, the United States has  not  held  that the harsh 
environmental characteristics of the Arctic justify special rights 
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and responsibilities for arctic coastal states (Beesley, 1972). 
However, the  weight  of international opinion  on this issue, as 
expressed  in  Article  234 of the Law  of the Sea  Convention (the 
“Arctic  exception  clause”), has  been shifting toward  the Cana- 
dian position. The extent of environmental control that Article 
234  allows is,  however, still debatable. The primary concern  of 
the United States regarding special forms of jurisdiction in the 
Arctic is that, if allowed,  a precedent  would  be established that 
might  then  be  imitated  in other areas  of  the  world  and that could 
affect U.S. security  and  commercial interests, specifically with 
regard  to  measures  the  Soviet  Union  might take in  its  own  vast 
arctic domain. 
OPPORTUNITIES  FOR COORDINATION AND COOPERATION 
The common  concerns  of  the  United States and Canada cited 
above and, in particular, the  common  need for environmental 
protection  and  safety  suggest there are many opportunities for 
the two countries to coordinate their activities in the Arctic. 
Although  the  United States and  Canada  already share informa- 
tion  and cooperate far more  than  generally realized, opportuni- 
ties exist for more comprehensive  coordination of navigation 
activities. 
Support services are essential if navigation is to  be expanded 
in the Arctic. These include provision of navigation aids, 
weather  and sea ice forecasting, search and rescue assistance, 
pilotage services, pollution prevention equipment,  icebreaker 
support  and  land-based  support facilities. In addition, it  would 
be practical to standardize regulations for pollution prevention 
and control, ship construction specifications and training and 
manning  standards  and to agree upon the extent of liability for 
pollution  caused  by  vessels  of either country within the exclu- 
sive economic zone of the other. Some  examples of ways to 
achieve greater coordination follow. 
Coastal states provide navigational aids as they deem fit. 
Most states adhere  to internationally accepted customs  (where 
formal  conventions  do not exist) for providing  navigation aids 
such as buoys, lighthouses, and direction-finding beacons. 
Organizations, such  as  the International Maritime  Organization 
(IMO)  and  the International Association  of Lighthouse Keep- 
ers, provide a forum wherein states can discuss matters of 
navigation  and safety. Information concerning aids the United 
States and  Canada  may  wish  to install or  provide in the Arctic is 
disseminated in  local  notices to mariners and later marked on 
navigational charts and published in the Admiralty List of 
Lights and other relevant admiralty and state publications. 
Therefore, the need for greater cooperation in this area is 
probably  minor.  However,  some  new types of navigational aids 
have been  developed  in  recent  years. 
Canada is very  interested  in the United States’ Global Posi- 
tioning System (GPS)  as  an  aid to navigation in the Canadian 
Arctic. If the Northwest Passage, for instance, is opened for 
year-round navigation, the Global Positioning System could 
become a key navigational aid, supplementing  other  systems 
currently in use  in  the region. The  Global  Positioning  System  is 
two tiered: the more precise position fixing system is reserved 
for Department of Defense requirements, whereas the less 
precise system  may  be  used  by commercial vessels as an  aid to 
navigation. Eventually, the United States and Canadian  coast 
guards may  wish to determine jointly how  best to use the Global 
Positioning System as  an  aid to navigation  in arctic waters. 
The two states could coordinate pilotage services in the 
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region. Pilots are engaged by shipmasters for their in-depth 
navigational  knowledge  of a local area. Each state will  promul- 
gate pilotage regulations for entering and leaving its  ports  in the 
Arctic. Since arctic waters  will be unfamiliar  to  most shipmas- 
ters, it may  initially  be  advisable  to  provide  merchant shipping 
with pilots for transiting the Arctic in areas under U.S. or 
Canadian jurisdiction. Since  a transarctic  voyage  may  extend 
several  thousand kilometres, the  region  will probably have to be 
divided into pilotage districts, and a transiting  vessel  may  have 
to  use the services  of  several pilots. For entering and leaving 
arctic ports, the use of pilots may be mandatory. Where the 
pilotage district of one state adjoins the district of another, 
coordination in  boarding  and disembarking may  be desirable in 
terms of cost effectiveness. For instance, the same helicopter 
from a  shore base or  a common  pilot  vessel could be  used for the 
pilots  of  both countries. 
As  an alternative to pilotage districts, the creation of arctic 
“ice  zones” has  been  suggested (C.  Stephenson, pers. comm. 
1984). If ice zones are established, vessels will carry “ice 
navigators” who will specialize in local knowledge of ice 
formation  and  of  ice characteristics such  as thickness, strength 
and  rate  and direction of drift. Whether  pilotage districts or ice 
zones are created, there is potential for coordination between 
adjoining districts or zones. A memorandum of understanding 
(MOU)  between the U.S.  Department of Transportation and the 
Canadian  Ministry of Transport (MOT) states that duplication 
of parallel national efforts should  be reduced.  Thus, it  may  be 
possible to work out  a cost-sharing formula  between the two 
local authorities. 
Timely weather and ice forecasts are of great operational 
value for navigation. Such forecasts are essential if marine 
transportation is to  expand  in the Arctic. They are also essential 
as  an  aid  in  combatting  oil spills. Both  the  United States and 
Canada  are  involved  in gathering, forecasting and disseminating 
weather and ice data. In the United States, for instance, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
maintains  an observatory in Barrow,  Alaska, to monitor atmo- 
spheric  constituents  important  o climate change. NOAA’s 
National  Weather Service (NWS) is  doing  research in Alaska 
regarding local climatic and oceanographic phenomena, and 
NOAA’s  National  Environmental Satellite Data  and Informa- 
tion Service (NESDIS) satellites provide information to the 
Navy/NOAA  Joint Ice Center, which analyzes ice occurrences 
and forecasts ice limits. 
Arctic navigation  would benefit if the weather  and ice fore- 
casting activities of all public agencies and private enterprises of 
the  United States and  Canada  could  be coordinated. In  order to 
determine how  such cooperation can  be promoted, the United 
States and  Canada  might consider establishing a  formal, bilat- 
eral advisory body. Among subjects for discussion  could be the 
issues of: how  and  at  what radio frequency  weather forecasts 
should  be  made  available to mariners  in  the Arctic; whether or 
not vessels plying arctic waters should be required to carry 
automatic picture  transmission (APT) satellite imagery as an  aid 
to ice  navigation;  and  how to share costs of providing  informa- 
tion among  all entities involved. 
Harmonization  of ship construction standards for ships that 
navigate arctic waters is another promising area for coordina- 
tion. Canada  has  developed comprehensive ship construction 
specifications for the Arctic under  the  authority  of its Arctic 
Waters Pollution Prevention Act. The United States, on the 
other hand, has  not  developed special standards for merchant 
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vessels navigating the Arctic, and little information has been 
exchanged  between  the  two c untries (L. Brigham, pers. comm. 
1984). If the United States develops specifications different 
from  those  of Canada, ships complying  with  the regulations of 
one country may  not  be able to transit the  waters  of  the other. 
Therefore, it is in  the interests of both countries to cooperate in 
establishing mutually  acceptable construction regulations. 
Establishment of a binational  body  that  has  both  advisory  and 
regulatory authority may provide a solution to the problem. 
Such a body  might be composed of personnel  from the U.S.  
Coast Guard, the U.S. Maritime  Administration  and the Cana- 
dian  Ministry of Transport. Before  adopting a ship construction 
standard, the  body  could  assemble a task  force  of experts from 
Canada and the United States to define problems, issues and 
alternatives related to the standard; analyze each alternative 
identified; draft and release a discussion memorandum; hold 
public hearings; and evaluate and analyze public responses. 
Canada  has  also established personnel  training  and  manning 
standards for vessels plying arctic waters. So far, the United 
States has  not  promulgated  any  such  special standards. Uniform 
standards jointly established  could  be  more  readily complied 
with  and  would  be  more acceptable to all shipping in the U.S. 
and  Canadian Arctic, including  third country vessels. A joint 
body, similar to  the  one  suggested for ship construction stan- 
dards, could be established to exchange information and set 
training  and  manning standards for arctic shipping. In  any case, 
the  United States will  probably  wish  to consider special stan- 
dards at  some point, given  the  nature of arctic shipping, and if it 
does so, will  likely  borrow  from  the  Canadian experience. 
An essential arctic navigation service is search and rescue 
capability. Since 1949, the  United States and  Canada  have  had a 
bilateral agreement  concerning  air search and rescue. There are 
no major problems  regarding coordination of search and rescue 
activities between  the  United States and Canada, but the poten- 
tial for coordinated  response decreases as  the distance from the 
maritime  boundary  between the two states increases. Moreover, 
industry carries out  most  of  its  own  search  and rescue activities. 
Nevertheless,  a joint effort to  improve  search  and rescue  capa- 
bility  in the Arctic  would benefit both countries. For  example, if 
coordination in adjacent pilotage districtdice zones is estab- 
lished, equipment such as the helicopters used for ferrying 
pilotdice navigators  could be used  in  search  and rescue  missions. 
There are many  ways in which icebreaker support is neces- 
sary or useful  in  the Arctic. Icebreakers are involved  in  search 
and rescue activities, are used by the petroleum industry to 
provide assistance for exploration  and development projects, 
are employed to supply  isolated  communities and, most  impor- 
tantly, will  be  needed  to  assist commercial navigation. There is 
no specific bilateral agreement or MOU covering icebreaker 
support, but there are many MOUs that promote  cooperation in 
this field. A formal bilateral advisory andor regulatory body 
could  be  established to coordinate the icebreaking needs of all 
end users (government  and private, Canadian and American), to 
develop construction  standards  and  to  establish criteria for user 
fees. Such coordination  would  help rationalize the existence of 
an icebreaker fleet  and  avoid  duplication  between the fleets of 
the two countries. 
As  one  more example of the many opportunities for better 
coordination of navigation activities, one might consider the 
coordinated establishment of fuel supply depots. It is customary 
for vessels to call at only selected ports for their bunkering 
needs. Establishment  of one bunkering  and  watering facility in 
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the  eastern  Arctic  and  one in the  western  Arctic  could serve the 
needs of the United States, Canada and (in the future) other 
maritime nations. 
ALTERNATIVE  TRANSIT  REGIMES 
For  the  purpose of this  essay a regime  may  be defined as the 
norms, rules and  procedures  agreed  to  by cooperating countries 
in order  to  regulate  behavior  within  an issue area. Regimes may 
vary  according  to  functional scope, areal domain  and  member- 
ship. Regimes may also vary according to the number and 
restrictiveness of their rights and rules, the extent to which 
agreements are formalized  and  the  manner  and egree to  which 
pressure is exerted on members (and nonmembers) to act in 
conformity  with  some clear-cut goal  (Young, 1980). Thus, an 
almost  unlimited  number  of different regimes  may  be  conceived 
for regulating arctic marine transportation. It is neither feasible 
nor  productive  to consider all  possible  regulatory alternatives, 
but  perhaps  it  is  worthwhile  to  try  to  identify  some  of the major 
types of navigation  regimes  that  might  be considered by either 
the  United States or  Canada or by  both countries. 
The assumptions are easily  made  that only a small number  of 
options exist, that  these options are already  well known and  that 
there is little room for moving  toward  more  mutally acceptable 
solutions. By providing a conceptual  framework  that identifies a 
reasonably  full  range  of options with respect to  both the jurisdic- 
tion  and  management  elements  of a transit regime, it can be 
shown that these assumptions are untrue. Table 1 shows a 
two-dimensional  matrix  laying  out the alternatives to be consid- 
ered below.  The major  reason for considering jurisdiction and 
management  dimensions  separately is that  workable  manage- 
ment options are not dependent on the type of jurisdiction. 
Thus, any  of  the  management options may  be combined with 
any of the jurisdiction options. Readers should be able to 
identify  intermediate alternatives along  both dimensions, some 
of which may be more acceptable to both countries. It is 
intended  that he matrix  and the remainder  of the essay serve as a 
point  of departure in  the consideration of  an acceptable  regime 
to govern arctic marine navigation. 
With the exception of the first alternative to be considered, 
the jurisdiction dimension  in Table 1 examines  regimes along a 
continuum  ranging  from  most exclusive to  most inclusive. The 
most exclusive class of  regimes are those  in  which the jurisdic- 
TABLE 1 .  Jurisdiction  and  management  options 
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tion of one country is absolute. The most inclusive class are 
those in which many members participate on a more or less 
equal basis. The management  dimension is considered along a 
continuum  that specifies the degree of cooperation and coordi- 
nation of activities. The “no coordination” option has been 
placed at one end of the scale; however, as we have seen, a 
considerable amount of coordin?tion  of navigation-related activ- 
ities  already exists between the United States and Canada. At 
the other end  of  the  scale  are the class of  management options 
characterized by great  independence  of  regulatory authority. In 
between are management options characterized by increasing 
degrees of coordination  and cooperation. 
SOME  LESS  PROMISING  ALTERNATIVES 
Theoretically, the United States and Canada and/or other 
arctic rim countries could decide that arctic waters are not 
subject to jurisdiction of any type and that throughout the 
applicable area of the  Arctic  Ocean complete freedom of the 
seas  would prevail. The rationale for this  decision  might  be  the 
collective belief  that the Arctic is remote  and unimportant and 
that, therefore, no  special controls are necessary. Historically, 
the.regime of  freedom of the seas for navigation  has  been the 
norm for many centuries. It is still  applicable  beyond the limits 
of internal waters, territorial  seas  or exclusive  economic  zones. 
Within the exclusive economic zone freedom of navigation 
applies, subject  only to specific, narrowly defined jurisdictional 
grants to coastal states. Beyondthis  zone, countries may exercise 
jurisdiction only over ships flying their flag; otherwise, the 
freedom of navigation is unrestricted. In  its extreme  form this 
type of regime  would  be one in  which, for all practical purposes, 
there would  be no controls over navigation  or  any other mari- 
time activities. 
Neither the United States nor  Canada is advocating  such a 
regime, and it is  not  seriously  suggested  that  they should. An 
“open  use”  regime is feasible only so long as the activities that 
take place  within  the  uncontrolled  region do not adversely affect 
the  interests of either country. This is clearly not the case within 
the exclusive economic  zones  of  any arctic rim country,  where, 
among other things, navigation activities may be harmful to 
arctic ecosystems. Both the United States and Canada have 
clearly stated that environmental protection, even in remote 
arctic waters, is an  important goal, and  this goal would  not  be 
Management 
Limited  Formal  Combination 
No Information  functional  bilateral advisory1  Indepen ent 
Jurisdiction  coo dinaexchange only coordination  advisory  body  regulatory  body commission 
No control  U  U  NIA  NIA  NIA  NIA 
Single control  (sector  theory) U uus uus uus uus uus 
Internal  waters (no special  accommodation) U uus uus uus uus  uus 
Internal  waters  (limited  jurisdiction:  Svalbard) U  P P  P P P 
Article 234 (broadly  construed) U  P P  P P  P 
Article 234 (narrowly  construed) U  P P  P P  P 
Recognized int’l  rules  (pre-LOS  ratification) U uc uc uc uc  uc 
International  control NIA U U  U U  U 
U: Unlikely to be considered by  either  country. 
UUS: Unacceptable to the United States. 
UC:  Unacceptable  to  Canada. 
P:  Promising. 
NIA:  Not  applicable. 
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well served in a regime that lacked regulations to control 
environmental degradation. However, it is useful to consider 
the open use  regime  in  relation  to thers that  will  be presented. 
While  open  and  uncontrolled access is unacceptable to either 
country, there  is  at least one advantage to  this  type  of regime that 
other alternatives do not  have:  no  appreciable costs for adminis- 
tration  and  enforcement  of  navigation activities. 
At the other end of the spectrum of alternatives is interna- 
tional jurisdiction over arctic waters, an option similar in its 
practical consequences to the open use option. Conceivably, 
arctic waters may have characteristics that qualify them for 
consideration as  part  of the “common heritage of mankind.” 
This type  of jurisdiction would  vest  authority  to regulate activi- 
ties  within arctic waters  in  an international organization, per- 
haps  modeled after the International Seabed Authority, which 
has been established by the Law of the Sea Convention to 
control seabed  mining  beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
Consequently, although the United States and Canada would 
probably be  members  of  the organization, they  would  not have 
any special jurisdiction in  the area. The likelihood is  negligible 
that  any  Arctic  rim  country  would  be  willing to give up 
jurisdiction it  now  possesses  to  an international organization. 
The United States does not  accept  the concept of the common 
heritage of mankind as applying  to the Arctic. Thus, this second 
option is also presented, not because it is likely to be adopted, 
but  because  it helps set the limits within  which more  promising 
jurisdictional options  may  be considered. 
It is questionable whether  any international regime can ade- 
quately address the arctic navigation concerns of the United 
States and Canada.  Weaker,  least-common-denominator solu- 
tions are a typical  result  when large numbers  of countries are 
involved  in establishing a  regime. In  this  sense the international 
regime  is similar to the open  use regime.  Moreover, the rela- 
tively greater difficulty of reaching agreement among many 
countries often produces a  cumbersome regulatory framework. 
On the other hand, because  of the number  of parties directly 
involved, international solutions may  be  more equitable. Does 
the  international  community  have a strong enough stake in arctic 
navigation  that  they  should  be  included  in deliberations for an 
arctic transit regime?  Regarding the authority to control marine 
pollution, Canada  and  the  United States have frequently argued 
for the strongest possible international environmental safe- 
guards. In the Arctic, Canada’s AWPPA contains  provisions 
that go  well beyond  provisions  any international organization 
would  be likely to establish. The more exclusive  regimes are 
likely to provide  better environmental protection. 
Less inclusive than international jurisdiction but nevertheless 
still inclusive, and  unlikely  to  be acceptable to any arctic rim 
country, is some  type  of  regional jurisdictional arrangement. 
One  such  option  would  be  to  establish a  condominium among all 
arctic rim countries to govern activities within arctic waters. 
The provision of a regional  framework for environmental pro- 
tection could  be an especially important benefit of this type  of 
regime, since pollution problems are often transnational in 
nature. Again, this  option  would require participating countries 
to waive some  types  of exclusive authority  they  now possess in 
exchange for joint authority. Although  this  idea  may appeal to 
some and, in fact, might  be a rational way to proceed  among 
countries with  common arctic concerns, the practical difficul- 
ties  of  persuading countries such as the United States and the 
Soviet Union  to  pool their authority are probably insurmount- 
able (Johnston, 1982). There is more potential for regional 
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management of navigation activities while  retaining  continued 
separate jurisdiction. 
Some types of jurisdiction that  would  be acceptable to  the 
United States may be unacceptable to Canada. The United 
States has  generally  taken  the  position  that  the  Arctic  should  not 
be  treated  as a special  region  and  therefore no  need exists for 
special international laws. Smith  has  noted  that  the consistent 
position of three of the circumpolar states, the  United States, 
Norway  and  Denmark (Greenland), has  been  that all questions 
of territorial definition  and  rights in the  Arctic  must  be  resolved 
through  the  application  of  general  law of the sea regimes. Under 
this view, the  only legitimate claims of  the circumpolar states 
would include the  continental  land mass, islands, inland waters, 
territorial seas  and  the  several  contiguous  zones defined by the 
international community. The  United States does  not  have  any 
special regulations governing tanker pollution in the Arctic. 
U.S. regulations contained  in  the Port and Tanker Safety  Act 
and  the  Clean  Water  Act are, for the  most part, consistent with 
existing international laws, which do not consider special rules 
for ice-covered areas. The Law of the Sea Convention, if 
ratified, will allow states to make additional rules for ice- 
covered areas, but  it is not  currently  in force. If only generally 
accepted  and  ratified  international  regulations  governed activi- 
ties  in  the Arctic, no  country  would  have special authority or 
jurisdiction to  control  pollution or transit. In this case Article 
234 would not be applicable, and any regulations that were 
based  upon  the  view  that  the  Arctic is special and, therefore, 
requires  special  pollution control regulations  would  be illegal. 
This  position  has  been  associated  with  the  United States and  is 
unacceptable  to Canada. 
On the other hand, there  are  several types of jurisdiction that 
might  be  acceptable  to  Canada  but  unacceptable to the  United 
States. In general, the  more  exclusive types of jurisdiction are 
the least acceptable  to  the  United States, and of these the most 
exclusive of all that  has  been suggested is jurisdiction based  on 
the sector principle. The sector principle  proposes  that arctic rim 
countries automatically  fall heir to all the  territory lying between 
their continental coastlines  and  the  North  Pole  in a sector  shaped 
like a pie slice, delimited  by the boundary lines of longitude that 
converge at  the  North  Pole (Reid, 1974). In  its  most extreme 
form,  sovereignty is  extended  not only  over land temtory but  to 
all water and ice within the sector as well. There have been 
many supportive statements of varying degrees for the sector 
principle in Canada, but this approach  has  not  been i corporated 
into official Canadian policy (Smith, 1978). No justification 
exists for this principle in international law, and the United 
States has neither accepted  the claims advanced  at various times 
by  both  Canada  and the Soviet  Union  nor ever given  any  public 
consideration to establishing a sector claim of  its own. 
With respect to transit  through sectors, as  we  have seen, there 
are many  reasons  why  the  United States and  Canada  would  want 
to cooperate and allow ships to transit through each other’s 
sector; however, since each  country would have  absolute sover- 
eignty within  its sector, there  would  be no  guarantee that transit 
rights would always be respected. Other countries could be 
excluded  from transit, and sector countries would  have  com- 
plete  authority  to  promulgate  and e force any  and all regulations 
they  deemed necessary. U.S.  opposition to the sector theory is 
based on its general  belief  that creeping jurisdiction over ocean 
space is  unacceptable  and  that greater jurisdiction will inhibit 
the freedoms maritime  powers  have traditionally enjoyed.  The 
United States is concerned  that establishing sectors would set a 
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precedent  for  further enclosure claims. Also, one  of  the princi- 
pal  beneficiaries  would  be  the  Soviet Union.  Soviet  sovereignty 
within  its  huge arctic sector  would effectively deny  access to 
any U. S.  activity  in  about  60%  of  the  Arctic Ocean.  Enclosure 
of the entire Arctic  Ocean  would  similarly  be unacceptable to 
the  international community, since the community’s  “rights” 
beyond the present limits of national jurisdiction would be 
considerably diminished. 
No  country  currently  formally advocates that arctic sectors  be 
established. Thus, it would  appear  that this alternative need  not 
be considered further. However, Canada does consider the 
waters  between  its  northern  islands to be internal, and although 
the  claim is not  widely accepted, in a practical sense the internal 
waters claim is  not  much  different  from a sector claim. In either 
case, the underlying idea of sole control seems to dominate 
Canadian thinking. If Canada’s archipelagic waters  were con- 
sidered to be internal  by  historic title, Canada  would  have  the 
strongest possible authority, just as if the area were part of a 
Canadian sector, to  make  and enforce any  regulations  it wished. 
The only difference is that  Canada  would  not have jurisdiction 
in the area of the North Pole, but for practical navigation 
purposes (at least until  commercial submarine tankers begin to 
use the polar route), jurisdiction in this area would  be unimport- 
ant. (However, sovereignty in this area may  be  important for 
other purposes. Among other things, Canada would obtain 
jurisdiction over  the  Alpha Ridge,  a  subsea rise that  may contain 
resources  that  might  some  day  be  commercially exploitable.) 
The United States opposes the claim that these waters are 
internal and, for reasons similar to those cited above, is not 
likely to acquiesce to this form of jurisdiction. Much more 
promising are those types of regimes  in  which absolute sover- 
eignty in  the  area is limited  but  in  which rules and regulations 
can  be  applied  that recognize the special problems associated 
with arctic activities. Several of these alternatives are consid- 
ered below. 
SOME  PROMISING  ALTERNATIVES 
Jurisdiction of a state over territory  normally carries with it a 
right  of absolute political control, whether over land, water or 
air. There are, however, many exceptions to absolute jurisdic- 
tion  in  which  territory  may be subject to restrictions favoring 
other states without encroachment upon the formal sovereignty 
of the state whose jurisdiction is restricted. These  exceptions to 
absolute jurisdiction are known as servitudes and are further 
defined  as obligations on the part of the state in  possession of the 
territory to permit a certain use to be  made of it by another state 
or states. The corresponding  right  on  the part of other states to 
make  use  of  the  territory  of  the first state may  be designated as 
an easement  (Fenwick, 1965). 
Servitudes have existed upon rivers, straits and canals 
expressly for the  purpose of enabling  freedom of navigation. 
This type  of  servitude is illustrated  by  the following  examples: 
1) Navigation  of the St. Lawrence River was fiist opened to 
U.S. vessels (in exchange for special privileges by British 
subjects to  navigate  Lake Michigan) by the Reciprocity Treaty 
in 1854.  This treaty  was  superseded  in 1871 by the Treaty of 
Washington, which provided that the St. Lawrence River, 
“from the point  where  it  ceased  to  be the international bound- 
ary, should  remain  ‘forever  free  and open for the purposes of 
commerce to the citizens of the United States’ ” (Fenwick, 
1965). The Treaty of Washington also provided that major 
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rivers in Alaska should be open to the commerce of British 
subjects. A more recent boundary convention between the 
United States and Canada will be discussed in some detail 
below. 2) The Kiel, or Prince William, Canal, entirely in 
German territory, connects the Baltic with the North Sea. In 
19  19 the  Treaty  of  Versailles  provided  that ‘ ‘the Kiel Canal and 
its  approaches  shall  be  maintained free and  open  to the vessels of 
commerce  and  of  war  of  all  nations at peace  with  Germany  on 
terms of entire equality.” Further  provision  was  made  that  the 
nationals, property  and  vessels  of  all  powers  should  be  treated  in 
respect to charges and facilities of traffic upon a footing of 
equality  with the nationals, property  and  vessels  of Germany 
(Fenwick, 1965). 
A different type of servitude, but one important  as  an arctic 
example, is the restriction  of the absolute  sovereignty of  Nor- 
way  over  the  Svalbard Archipelago,  a  group of islands in  the 
Arctic Ocean north of Norway. Until 1920 the islands were 
unclaimed  and unwanted, but  increasing  economic activity on 
the islands in tnis period created the need for some form of 
administrative  jurisdiction.  Accordingly,  sovereignty  was 
awarded to neutral  Norway  at  the  Versailles  Peace Conference 
at  the  end  of  World  War I. However,  under the  terms  of  the 
treaty all forty signatories were entitled to free access to the 
resources within the treaty area. Thus, signatories have the 
freedom to fish, hunt, mine and carry on other commercial 
activities equally  with Norway, subject  only to a common set of 
regulations  that  apply  to  all contracting parties (Westermeyer, 
1984). 
Clearly, there may  be  some  promise for creating a servitude 
or servitudes with respect to transit through arctic waters. 
Smith, for one, has raised the issue of whether it would be 
“beneficial, in light of  economic  and strategic factors, [for the 
United States] to make a compromise  concession  of the special 
internal status of  the  Canadian  Arctic’s archipelagic waters in 
exchange for a yielding of the sector claims and formal  guaran- 
tees of U.S.  navigationrights”  (Smith, 1978). The details ofthe 
compromise might spell out  pollution control and other naviga- 
tion regulations acceptable to both countries. The easement 
could also apply to other countries that intend to use the 
Northwest  Passage  and  that are willing  to  accept  the t rms of  the 
compromise.  Such a compromise would benefit Canada in that 
the United States would recognize,  once and for all, Canada’s 
jurisdiction over both islands and water in the Arctic.. U.S. 
recognition is clearly  important  if general international accep- 
tance of Canada’s  claim is to be obtained. On the other  hand, 
Canada  may  have difficulty accommodating  some restrictions 
of its ability to regulate navigation through the Northwest 
Passage. It  remains  unclear  whether  Canada  is  more concerned 
about  securing  formal  sovereignty  over arctic waters or about 
controlling all the activities that take place  in these waters. No 
doubt, Canada would prefer both absolute sovereignty and 
control, but if the United States and Canada can agree on 
mutually acceptable navigation regulations, this compromise 
might find favor in Canada. In  this case, the benefits  Canada 
would receive would  outweigh the concessions it would have to 
make. 
The United States would  have  its  interest in the freedom of 
navigation  satisfied by this  compromise; however, the problems 
with this alternative would be the same as the problems the 
United States would  have  in creating arctic sectors or  recogniz- 
ing without compromise the internal status of archipelagic 
waters - that is, the compromise could  be  used  as  an excuse by 
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other countries to extend jurisdiction into other zones. This 
would not be in the interest of the United States in limiting 
constraints worldwide on the  freedom of navigation. In addi- 
tion, the United States does not  want  to  be  in  the  position  of 
having to negotiate  bilateral  agreements  with  all coastal nations 
who identify “special” circumstances. Nevertheless, if the 
Canadian case is considered unique, the United States has 
nothing to lose with  such a  compromise. 
If control of transportation activities per se is deemed by 
arctic coastal states a more  important issue than the jurisdic- 
tional status of arctic waters, then  there is promise for regimes 
based upon special jurisdiction to control marine pollution, 
which  Article 234 of the  Law  of  the Sea Convention confers. 
The article states that 
coastal states have the right to adopt and enforce non- 
discriminatory laws and regulations  for the prevention,  reduc- 
tion and control  of  marine  pollution from vessels in ice-covered 
areas  within  the  limits of the exclusive economic zone, where 
particularly  severe climatic conditions  and  the  presence  of  ice 
covering such areas  for  most  of the year create obstructions or 
exceptional  hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine 
environment  could cause major harm to or  irreversible distur- 
bance of the ecological  balance.  Such  laws and regulations shall 
have due regard to navigation  and  the  protection and preserva- 
tion of the marine environment based on the best available 
scientific  evidence  [United  Nations, 19821. 
The United States has  not  signed the Law  of  the Sea  Conven- 
tion. However, United States rejection of  the convention was 
based  largely on objections to its  seabed  mining provisions. The 
remaining sections of  the  convention are generally acceptable to 
the United States, and  Article 234, in particular, has  not  been 
controversial. Even if the United States never signs the conven- 
tion, it could  enact special regulations to control marine pollu- 
tion  in  its arctic waters  consistent  with the provisions of  Article 
234. 
Canada  played a  major role in drafting this article during the 
Law  of the  Sea negotiations. The  general international accep- 
tance of Article 234 has lent some legitimacy to the 1970 
Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. Neverthe- 
less, the question  remains  whether the jurisdiction asserted  by 
Canada  under  its arctic waters legislation constitutes an exercise 
of jurisdiction that  Canada as an arctic coastal state is permitted 
under  international  law (McRae and  Goundry , 1982). 
The authority  that  Article 234 confers upon  Canada  to control 
navigation  in  the  Northwest  Passage is less absolute than if its 
archipelagic waters  were  deemed  to  be internal. Specifically, 
any laws applicable to its exclusive  economic zone  that Canada 
is  enabled to make  pursuant to Article 234 must  have due regard 
for navigation. Thus, the article implies  that  some  navigation 
must  be  allowed  and  that regulations cannot have the effect of 
restricting innocent passage of ships. Moreover, it does not 
seem likely that Law of the Sea negotiators intended arctic 
coastal states to  have  more  pollution control authority within 
their exclusive economic  zones  than  in their territorial seas. In 
addition, Article 236 exempts  military  vessels from the provis- 
ions of  the  convention applicable to environmental protection. 
Nevertheless, the  provisions  of  Article 234 enable  Canada and 
other arctic rim countries to assert substantial control over 
navigation activities. 
Arctic 234 is, however, subject to both a broad  and  narrow 
interpretation (McRae and Goundry, 1982). These interpreta- 
tions can  be  considered  as distinct jurisdiction options. Broad 
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interpretation of the article would enable coastal states to  enact 
laws and regulations in any area “where particularly severe 
climatic conditions and  the  presence of ice covering such  areas 
for most of the  year create obstructions  and exceptional hazards 
to navigation, and  pollution  of  the  marine  environment  could 
cause major  harm  to  or ir eversible disturbance of  the ecological 
balance,” without  regard  to  the  environmental conditions exist- 
ing  at  the time. Thus, the  power of the  coastal state to legislate or 
to enforce regulations  would  not  be restricted by the  absence of 
severe climatic conditions or ice in the  area  at  the  time  but  would 
apply  throughout  the year. 
The case of passage  through international straits is a specific 
exception to the rules normally applicable to navigation. For 
international straits a nonsuspendable  right of transit passage 
applies. Whether  the  Northwest  Passage  is  now or is capable of 
becoming  an  international strait has  been disputed; however,  a 
broad  interpretation of Article 234 renders  this issue irrelevant 
because the provisions of the article can be interpreted to 
override the  restrictions on coastal state jurisdiction that  apply in 
the  international  regime  governing straits (McRae and Goundry, 
1982). Therefore, the  broad interpretation places  no limitations 
on the coastal state to enact special pollution control regulations 
in areas, including  international straits, which for at least part of 
the  year are covered  by ice or  otherwise are subject to severe 
environmental conditions. 
On  the  other hand, according  to the narrow interpretation of 
Article 234, special laws and regulations would apply only 
when  the  circumstances  defined  in  the article are present. That 
is, regulations  would  apply  only  when  ice  is  present or when 
problems arise from severe climatic conditions, but  measures  to 
deal with  marine  pollution  unrelated  to these situations would  be 
governed by  normal  rules applicable to the exclusive  economic 
zone (McRae and Goundry, 1982). In effect, two legal regimes 
would operate, depending  on conditions. When special hazards 
are present, regulations enacted pursuant to Article 234 would 
apply. In the absence of special hazards, regulation  of  marine 
pollution  would  be  governed  by  the  usual regime  operable in  the 
exclusive economic zone, and  in  this latter case, therefore, the 
international regime  governing straits, where applicable, would 
be relevant. Thus, the  question of whether the Northwest 
Passage is an international strait becomes relevant. If so, 
Canada would be unable to suspend innocent passage or to 
impose design, construction or manning standards at times of 
the  year  when  the  area is not ice covered (McRae and Goundry, 
1982). 
The broad  interpretation  of  Article 234 unquestionably  gives 
coastal states more authority to control navigation activities 
within their exclusive economic zones than does the narrow 
interpretation. Nevertheless, the practical difference between 
the interpretations may be minimal, and control over special 
hazards appears to be adequate in either case. The Canadian 
Arctic Waters  Pollution  Prevention  Act  is  based  upon a broad 
rather than  narrow interpretation of  Article 234, since the  act 
does not distinguish between regulating for the hazards that 
derive from the  ice-covered  nature of the area and regulating to 
prevent other kinds  of environmental  harm.  However, McRae 
and  Goundry  point  out  that the narrow interpretation is consis- 
tent with  the “special measures” proposals (regarding the 
authority to enact  more stringent regulations in certain areas) by 
Canada  and other states  made  at  the 1973 IMCO  Conference and 
with Canada’s position at the earlier sessions of the Law  of  the 
Sea Conference  (McRae  and Goundry, 1982). 
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Whether  or  not  the  United States would object to the  narrow 
interpretation of Article 234, in light of the general international 
acceptance  of  the article, is questionable. The broad interpreta- 
tion, however, would  surely  give the United States more  of a 
problem, since  the  United States considers the  Northwest  Pas- 
sage to be an international strait and does not at this time 
subscribe  to the view  that  the  special  regulations  in  ice-covered 
areas  allowed  under  Article  234  apply  to international straits. 
Moreover, the United States apparently does not believe that the 
additional  authority  granted by the broad interpretation is  neces- 
sary. At  some point, the  interest  of the United States in  holding 
the line on greater limitations to the freedom of navigation 
overtakes its interest in the protection of the environment. 
Regarding  the AWPPA, there  seems little reason for the United 
States to oppose  the  act’s  construction  and equipment  standards 
applicable  when special hazards apply, as  long as they are not 
unnecessarily rigid or overly costly, but the United States is 
unlikely to back  off  its  opposition to the  act’s special 100-mile 
pollution  control zone. 
MANAGEMENT  ALTERNATIVES 
Thus far, only options for jurisdiction have  been considered. 
However, as  indicated  in  Table 1, a range of transit management 
alternatives exists that can be considered independent of the 
jurisdiction options. Even if the United States and Canada 
cannot formally agree about the extent of jurisdiction that 
coastal states  have in arctic waters, there are numerous  ways  by 
which  to  coordinate  and  rationally  manage  navigation ctivities. 
Dismissing from further consideration the unrealistic alterna- 
tive of not coordinating any navigation-related activities, the 
least comprehensive type  of  management regime is one  in  which 
interaction is limited  to collecting and exchanging information. 
The purposes of this type  of  regime are simply to inform each 
country of  what  the other is doing and to exchange scientific and 
environmental data  pertinent  to the operations of each country. 
The United States and  Canada  already engage in  information 
exchange concerning a wide  variety  of arctic issues. For 
instance, similar agencies, such  as  the U.S. and Canadian coast 
guards, regularly exchange information about such things as 
weather  and  sea ice conditions. The  forum Annual  Review of 
Hydrocarbon and Related Developments in the Beaufort Sea 
and  Environs is a particularly interesting and relevant example 
of information  exchange  between  the  United States and Canada. 
This  forum, organized  by  the foreign affairs agencies of  both 
countries, has  been  in existence for eight years. It brings 
together representatives from U.S. and Canadian  agencies that 
have  responsibilities  in  the Arctic to discuss the current Beaufort 
Sea activities of each country. Such a  forum could evolve into a 
useful model for a more comprehensive transit management 
regime  as  necessity arises. 
In addition to simple information exchange, limited func- 
tional coordination  may  be considered.  The  purpose of this type 
of regime is to standardize  the behavior of the participants by 
imposing  common routines. As  noted in section 111, there are a 
number of ways in which the United States and Canada do 
coordinate navigation-related activities, and opportunities exist 
for additional functional coordination. An important navigation- 
related example of functional coordination is the Canada-United 
States Joint Marine  Pollution  Contingency Plan. The plan 
provides a framework for cooperation in response to pollution 
incidents that may pose a significant threat to the waters or 
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coastal  areas of both countries or  that are of such magnitude, 
although only affecting the waters of one  country, as to justify a 
call on the other  party for assistance (United States Coast Guard 
and Canadian Coast Guard, 1983). Among other things, the 
plan establishes alerting and notification procedures, a com- 
mand structure, post-cleanup requirements and arrangements 
for assuming the responsibility for the cost of operations. 
Responsibilities for the  Beaufort  Sea are specified  in  Annex  IV 
of the plan. 
Several other  navigation-related bilateral agreements are also 
in force between  the  United States and Canada. Of note is an 
agency-to-agency  agreement  between  the  United States Coast 
Guard and the Department of the Environment of Canada 
concerning  research  and development  cooperation in  oil spill 
response technology.  A major  purpose  of  this agreement is to 
study  the  behavior  of  spilled  oil  in  ice-infested  waters  and  to 
develop appropriate oil spill countermeasures for use in the 
Arctic. Non  arctic-related  agreements also exist. For instance, 
in  1979  the  United States and  Canada  signed  an agreement for a 
cooperative vessel traffic management  system for the  Juan de 
Fuca region. The two  countries established in 1909 the Interna- 
tional Joint Commission to help prevent and settle disputes 
regarding the use of boundary waters. The commission is 
discussed in  more  detail below. 
Given  the  potential dramatic increase in navigation  through 
arctic waters, consideration  of a more comprehensive manage- 
ment structure may make sense. Options may be considered 
along a continuum  including establishment of a  formal bilateral 
advisory  body to address arctic navigation issues, establishment 
of a body  with  not  only  advisory functions but  some regulatory 
authority  as  well  and establishment of a completely  independent 
bilateral regime for regulating transit in ice-covered areas. 
The Arctic  Policy Forum, for which  this  paper  was prepared, 
is an excellent example of the  type  of  advisory  body  that  could 
be  formalized to address  navigation issues. As currently consti- 
tuted, the  Arctic  Policy  Forum  brings  together respected citi- 
zens  from the United States and  Canada to discuss, in a purely 
private setting, arctic issues of  mutual concern.  The  forum has 
been  organized to establish, through  informal discussions, new 
management  and  regulatory  techniques to  handle  arctic 
problems:  by  identifying the full range of interests and  policy 
options for any  problem  of  mutual concern, by understanding 
how these interests and options relate to one  another and by 
comparing the preferred options of each country. Where options 
overlap or  where the differences between options  can be 
resolved, forum members as one  body  would  make recommen- 
dations to both governments. 
Young  and Osherenko have  proposed the establishment of a 
somewhat  more  formal deliberative body “whose role would  be 
to encourage the emergence of a problem solving atmosphere 
regarding Arctic resource conflicts” (Young and Osherenko, 
1984). Their  proposed  Arctic  Resources  Council  (ARC)  would 
be a representative body  composed  of  members  of all interest 
groups  with a legitimate stake in  the Arctic, including industry, 
native  and  environmental groups and local, regional  and national 
government representatives. The ARC  would stress problem- 
solving approaches (as opposed to the adversarial approaches 
prevalent in legislative bodies or courts) such as mediation, 
controlled communication,  simulation exercises and future 
imaging. Correspondingly, the ARC would not hand down 
binding judgments, but would weigh the relative merits of 
different approaches  and attempt to accommodate competing 
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interests. It is further envisioned  that the council might super- 
vise  research  related  to  issues  under consideration. For this  and 
other purposes a permanent secretariat would be established at 
an appropriate arctic location. Young  and Osherenko hope  that 
the council will eventually  evolve into a region-wide  mecha- 
nism for resolving arctic resource conflicts, but they suggest 
that councils first be  established  as  national deliberative bodies. 
Thus,  a binational U.S  .-Canadian ARC  would  be  an intermedi- 
ate step, with  Arctic  transportation issues under  the  purview  of 
such a binational council. 
A yet more comprehensive regime that might serve as a 
model for arctic transit  management is the International Joint 
Commission (IJC) (International Joint Commission, 1983). The 
IJC was established under the provisions of the Boundary 
Waters Treaty of 1909 as a permanent binational body. The 
commission  not  only  advises  but  has  some r gulatory authority 
as well. It consists of three U.S. and three Canadian  commis- 
sioners. The U. S . and  Canadian  co-chairmen serve full time; the 
other  commissioners serve part time. Business is conducted as a 
single body. The purpose of the IJC is to prevent disputes 
regarding  the  use  of  boundary  and  transboundary  waters  and to 
settle questions arising  between the United States and  Canada 
along their common  border (International Joint Commission, 
1983). The IJC provides a framework for cooperation regarding 
water  and air pollution  and  the  regulation  of  water levels and 
flows. The basic rationale for the IJC is that solutions to 
problems  in  which  the  United States and  Canada  have different 
or  opposing interests should  be  sought  not  by  the  usual bilateral 
adversary  negotiations  but in the joint deliberations of a perma- 
nent tribunal. In  this sense, it is similar to the proposed  Arctic 
Resources Council. 
The IJC has three roles. In one capacity it functions as an 
advisory  body  to  the U.S. and  Canadian governments. In this 
role the commission  investigates matters of difference along the 
common  border  and  then  reports the facts in a single commis- 
sion report. Recommendations are made  in  these reports, but 
decisions are  left to the respective governments.  A second role 
is to monitor and coordinate implementation of commission 
recommendations that have been accepted by both govern- 
ments.  The third  function  of  the IJC is quasi-judicial in nature. 
The commission  can approve or disapprove applications to use 
or divert water  on one side of  the  boundary  that  would affect the 
natural  water  level or flow  on the other side. Regarding  other 
types of decisions, both governments may refer questions  on 
differences of  opinion to the  commission forresolution, although 
this  has  never  been done. To help carry out its functions, the 
commission is aided by 25 binational advisory  boards.  These 
boards are responsible for technical  studies or field work that 
may  be necessary. 
A proposed Arctic Waters International Joint Commission 
(AWIJC), with jurisdiction throughout U.S. and Canadian 
arctic waters, might operate in a similar manner. For  matters of 
a purely  operational  nature  the  AWUC  could  be granted quasi- 
judicial authority. For matters  wherein jurisdiction or the alloca- 
tion  of rights might  be involved, it could function as a purely 
advisory body. In either case the AWIJC could  monitor  naviga- 
tion activities and  make  recommendations  on such matters as 
ship-related pollution. With respect to pollution, the Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement, under which the UC has a 
number  of specific responsibilities, could serve as a model for a 
joint arctic water  quality agreement. 
The management  of the St. Lawrence  Seaway is an example 
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of a  comprehensive navigation-related regime that may have 
special relevance for the Arctic. The  Seaway, which connects 
the  Great  Lakes to the  Atlantic Ocean, was  opened to deep draft 
shipping in 1959. It is jointly operated and  maintained by the St. 
Lawrence  Seaway  Development Corporation  (SLSDC) of  the 
United States and  by the St. Lawrence  Seaway  Authority 
(SLSA) of Canada.  The  SLSDC is a wholly  owned government 
corporation and has been an operating administration of the 
U.S. Department of Transportation since 1966. The SLSDC 
owns  all  its  property  and is self-sustaining. Operations, mainte- 
nance and capital improvement costs are paid from the U.S. 
share of  the  tolls  for  use  of  the  Montreal to Lake Ontario section 
of the Seaway.  The United States operates two of the seven 
locks in this  section  and is therefore entitled to  29%  of the tolls. 
The SLSA is a crown  corporation  under  the direction of Cana- 
da’s Minister  of Transport. Its organizational structure is similar 
to that of the SLSDC, and it is likewise self-sustaining. The 
SLSA collects tolls for both the United States and Canada. 
Together, the  agencies operate all  seaway  locks  and channels 
and  provide  vessel traffic control assistance between  Montreal 
and  Lake Erie. They also jointly manage the Seaway Interna- 
tional Bridge, publish transit regulations, establish tolls, set 
opening and  closing dates (related  to  ice conditions - new  ice 
navigation  technology  used  by  both countries has  enabled  the 
navigation season to be lengthed from 7.5 to 8.5 months), 
participate in the St. Lawrence River Board of Control (an 
adjunct  of  the  International  Joint Commission) and  work together 
daily on  operational matters. Requests for permission to transit 
the St. Lawrence Seaway are initiated by the ship owner or 
agent, who fills out a pre-clearance form for both agencies 
establishing that the ship meets financial and safety require- 
ments. Altogether, there  is a significant amount  of coordination 
between  the  two separate national agencies. 
At least two of the features of the St. Lawrence Seaway 
regime have special significance for an arctic transit regime: 
user fees, apportioned  perhaps  according  to  the proportion of 
kilometres transited in each territory, and establishment of 
financial and  safety  requirements for ships. However, there  is 
an important difference between St. Lawrence Seaway and 
Arctic Ocean navigation. The United States and  Canada share a 
common boundary along part of the St. Lawrence Seaway. 
Where the St. Lawrence River is entirely within Canadian 
territory, an  easement exists, widely recognized as applying to 
“international” rivers, which enables the  United States to have 
access to its own waters. In the Arctic the United States and 
Canada are adjacent, rather than opposite, states. Clearly, 
cooperation has  been  much easier in the opposite state situation, 
where  waters  are shared, than in the adjacent situation, even  if 
navigation  and  other interests are essentially the same. 
More  comprehensive bilateral regimes  might  be considered. 
Thus,  a fully independent  commission  with extensive regula- 
tory  authority for matters relating to  marine  navigation can be 
envisioned.  There are  few examples of  binational commissions 
with  such a  degree of  independence (the Mixed Commission of 
the Danube, discussed  by Fenwick, was  perhaps unusual in  that 
it  was  given  the  power  to  reach de isions by  majority  vote  and to 
impose  and enforce penalties for the violation of its regulations 
[Fenwick, 19651). However, one might argue that the prob- 
lems  associated  with  navigation  in  the Arctic are so unique, the 
potential for environmental  harm so great and  the technology so 
costly and specialized that a highly innovative regime is in 
order. For instance, perhaps a joint but independent authority 
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should own and be responsible for the operation of  all  arctic 
vessels. As an analogy, some have argued that due to the 
exceedingly  difficult  economic,  social  and  safety  issues 
associated  with  nuclear  energy development, the nuclear indus- 
try  would  be  in  better shape today  if  it  had  been operated from 
the  beginning by the  government  rather  than  by private industry 
(R. Stockman, pers. comm. 1984). Arctic marine navigation 
may well fall into that class of activities undertaken more 
rationally  by  the  public sector than by  the  private sector. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper  has demonstrated that there  are a variety  of options 
for both jurisdiction and  management  of  arctic marine naviga- 
tion. It is also evident that Canada  and the United States already 
coordinate navigation-related activities in a wide variety of 
ways  and  in a number  of geographic areas. If  both countries are 
willing to come together and  listen to what each is saying, there 
should be no significant bamers to resolving arctic jurisdic- 
tional issues and to devising rational management regimes. One 
of  the  most  important  mutual interests of the United States and 
Canada is pursuit  and maintenance of the friendly ties that bind 
them together. In some areas relations have been strained in 
recent  years. The issue of arctic  marine transportation is poten- 
tially divisive, but, with  political will, it could be an  issue that 
helps to reinforce  the  friendly relations between  two longstand- 
ing allies. 
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